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Objective
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 Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are known 
and documented phenomenon that limit the 
benefit of system redundancy as a design 
approach to achieve high reliability
 Because Launch vehicle data is sparse, 
generic data from the nuclear industry is 
used to estimate CCF for launch vehicles
 This presentation addresses the impact of 
CCF risk on system reliability and safety
Key Definitions
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 A common cause failure (CCF) is a failure 
where:
 Two or more items fail within the mission time from a 
common failure mechanism.
 Beta Factor is defined as the fraction of the 
component failures that result in a common 
cause failure
Calculating Common Cause Failure
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CCFs may also be viewed as being caused by the presence of two factors: 
1. Root or proximate Cause, i.e., the reason (or reasons) for failure of each 
component that failed in the CCF event, and a
2. Coupling Factor (or factors) that was responsible for the involvement of multiple 
components.
𝜷 =
𝝀𝑪
𝝀𝑻
⇒ 𝝀𝑪 = 𝜷𝝀𝑻;
𝝀𝑰= (𝟏 − 𝜷)𝝀𝑻
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Examples 
(taken from the NASA PRA Guide)
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The following are examples of actual CCF events:
 Hydrazine leaks leading to two APU explosions on Space Shuttle mission STS-9
 Multiple engine failures on aircraft (Fokker F27 –1997, 1988; Boeing 747, 1992)
 Three hydraulic system failures following Engine # 2 failure on a DC-10, 1989
 Failure of all three redundant auxiliary feed-water pumps at Three Mile Island NPP
 Failure of two Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) controllers on two separate engines when a 
wire short occurred
 Failure of two O-rings, causing hot gas blow-by in a solid rocket booster of Space Shuttle flight 
51L
 Failure of two redundant circuit boards due to electro-static shock by a technician during 
replacement of an adjacent unit
 A worker accidentally tripping two redundant pumps by placing a ladder near pump motors 
to paint the ceiling at a nuclear power plant
 A maintenance contractor unfamiliar with component configuration putting lubricant in the 
motor winding of several redundant valves, making them inoperable
 Undersized motors purchased from a new vendor causing failure of four redundant cooling 
fans
 Check valves installed backwards, blocking flow in two redundant lines
 CCFs may also be viewed as being caused by the presence of two factors:
7Reducing it
Checklist for reducing common cause 
categorized into 8 groups
1. Degree of physical separation/segregation
2. Diversity/redundancy (e.g., different technology, design, 
different maintenance personnel)
3. Complexity/maturity of design/experience
4. Use of assessments/analysis and feedback data
5. Procedures/human interface (e.g., maintenance/testing)
6. Competence/training/safety culture
7. Environmental control (e.g., temperature, humidity, 
personnel access)
8. Environmental testing
8Impact of Varied CCF and 
Abortability
 CCF estimate becomes important when 
trading between a 1 out of 2 system and 1 
component fails
 Abort immediately or continue mission
 STS used fail opt/fail safe redundancy 
 Cost/weight concerns limit some systems to 
one level of redundancy
 What is the benefit of adding an additional 
level of redundancy
9Response Surface for Various CCF 
Beta
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Takeaways
 Common cause failure is a known impact to redundant 
system
 Common modeling assumptions may underestimate 
the real risks
 When data is unavailable, it is important to judge the 
impact of system reliability, safety, and common 
cause factors over a range of values
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